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Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence
Debate
Stephen M. Bainbridge*
Although participants in the convergence debate disagree as to whether
international corporate governance is converging on the U.S. model, there is
general agreement as to the nature of that model. Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman argue, for example, that corporate governance systems around the
world are converging towards "the 'standard shareholder-oriented model' of the
corporate form,"' which they assert has always been the dominant model in the
United States and the United Kingdom.2 In contrast, while Roberta Romano
expresses skepticism about the extent of (and the desirability of) global corporate
governance convergence, she too assumes that U.S. jurisdictions tend "to adopt
laws that maximize shareholder wealth."3 In sum, the literature assumes that the
U.S. model, towards which global systems are (or are not) converging, is one of
shareholder primacy.'
This is an error. The term shareholder primacy typically connotes two
distinct principles: (1) The shareholder wealth maximization norm, pursuant to
which directors are obliged to make a decision based solely on the basis of long-
term shareholder gain. This principle is well-established in U.S. corporate law,
and for purposes of this essay, may be taken as given;5 (2) The principle of
* Professor of Law, University of California, at Los Angeles, School of Law. Subject to the standard
disclaimers, I thank my colleague Bill Klein for his helpful comments.
1. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End ofHistoryfor Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441
(2001).
2. Id. at 468.
3. Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102
YALEL.J. 2021, 2031 (1993).
4. See Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate
Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 347 (2001) (asserting that "United States academic elites, including
the global convergence advocates, seem to hold as universal a view of... profit maximization as each firm and
the nation's goal"); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2128 (2001) (noting that "Professors Hansmann
and Kraakman have provided a provocative account of one of the principal mechanisms driving corporate
convergence: the ascendance of the shareholder primacy norm .. "); see, e.g., James A. Fanto, The Role of
Corporate Law in French Corporate Governance, 31 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 31, 32 (1998) (assuming that
"technological changes and the globalization of the economy are pushing corporate governance worldwide
towards a U.S.-style market capitalism"); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence
of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 330-31 (2001) (citing prior work in which he "extolled the
American system because [of] its openness to external monitoring through a stock market-centered capital
market"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder
Capitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 219, 219 (1999) (asking whether "corporate governance will
ultimately converge" on the "Anglo-American model whose features are shaped by the shareholder primacy
norm"); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (opining that "[sihareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate
goal in American business circles").
5. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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ultimate shareholder control. Although shareholders do not wield day-to-day
authority, they purportedly exercise ultimate decisionmaking authority through
proxy contests, institutional investor activism, shareholder litigation, and the
market for corporate control. Here is where the error lies.
Insofar as control is concerned, U.S. corporate law is far more accurately
described as a system of director primacy than one of shareholder primacy. As Berle
and Means famously demonstrated, U.S. public corporations are characterized by a
separation of ownership and control.6 The firm's nominal owners, the shareholders,
exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy.7
Instead, control is vested in the hands of professional managers, who typically own
only a small portion of the firm's shares.8
The separation of ownership and control is virtually carved into stone by
U.S. corporate law. Under all corporation statutes, the vast majority of corporate
decisions are assigned to the board of directors or their subordinates acting
alone.9 Shareholders essentially have no power to initiate corporate action and,
indeed, are entitled to approve or disapprove only a very few board actions.' ° The
direct restrictions on shareholder power supplied by U.S. corporate law are
supplemented by a host of other economic and legal forces that prevent U.S.
investors from exercising significant influence over corporate decisionmaking. "
Indeed, if one wants to observe a shareholder primacy model in action,
Slovenia would be a better example than the United States. (I use Slovenia herein
for comparative purposes because it is a regime with which I have developed
some familiarity.) To be sure, Slovenia's corporate law system formally
contemplates extensive labor involvement through a system of codetermination
modeled on German law." Reportedly, management capture is also a dominant
feature of Slovenian firms. All the same, however, privatization of Slovenia's
social-owned enterprises was effected by a mandatory allocation of shares to a
combination of investment funds, employees, former employees, plus a public
sale of shares. 3 As a result, Slovene corporate share ownership is now bifurcated
between large-potentially influential-institutional shareholders and relatively
powerless diffuse small holders. The basic building blocks of Slovene corporate
6. ADOLF A. BERLE& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66
(1932).
7. Id. at 82.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (describing relevant state corporation code provisions).
10. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (describing relevant state corporation code provisions).
11. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Constraints on Shareholder Activism in the United States and
Slovenia (May 17, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.comi/sol3/delivery.cfm/00517315.pdf?abstractid=2287
80 (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer) (summarizing constraints); see also infra notes 24-28 and
accompanying text.
12. See generally Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized
Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 58-60 (2001) (describing labor role).
13. See id. at 53-56 (describing the processes by which privatization was effected).
The Transnational Lawyer/Vol. 16
governance thus differ rather dramatically from those of the United States. The
groundwork for shareholder primacy has been laid.
The convergence literature's erroneous understanding of the U.S. model
distorts both the positive and normative aspects of the convergence debate. On
the positive side, if we use the extent of shareholder primacy as our metric, we
will end up with a distorted estimate of the extent to which systems have
converged. 14 On the normative side, corporate governance is a potentially
important instrument by which to increase the economy's efficiency. 5 In recent
years, elite U.S. corporate law scholars have played a significant role in
"reforming" the corporate laws of transition economies. If the goal is to export
the U.S. model, on the assumption of its superiority, we do those economies no
good-and may do much harm-by exporting the wrong model.
Does it matter? Is director primacy superior to shareholder primacy? Put
another way, should a transitional economy, such as Slovenia, encourage or
discourage corporate governance activism by institutional investors? This essay
acknowledges that investor participation in corporate governance has economic
benefits, but argues that on balance director primacy is preferable.
I. DIRECTOR PRIMACY IN THE UNITED STATES
Although they are often used interchangeably, the terms shareholder primacy
and shareholder wealth maximization in fact express quite distinct concepts. The
shareholder wealth maximization norm is a basic feature of U.S. corporate
governance. In 1919, the Michigan Supreme Court gave the shareholder wealth
maximization norm its classic statement: "A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end."' 7 Seven decades later, the influential
Delaware court of chancery likewise opined: "It is the obligation for directors to
attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation's
14. Whether global corporate governance systems are in fact converging toward the U.S. model is
beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that I am agnostic but skeptical. In my view, Montesquieu's
observation that law cannot be expected to develop universal patterns remains highly pertinent even in today's
global economy. RUSSELL KRM, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 352 (3d ed. 1991) (quoting Montesquieu:
"For men's circumstances vary mightily one from another-affected by climate, by soil, by extent of country,
by historic experience, by customs and habits, by strategic situation, by commerce and industry, by religion, by
a multitude of other influences. Therefore every people develop their own particular laws, and rightly so").
15. I assume that efficient corporate governance can promote overall economic efficiency, while
recognizing that the economic impact of corporate governance reform will often be swamped by other
economic factors. For a more skeptical account, see Romano, supra note 3, at 2023 (arguing there is no
empirical evidence "that corporate governance arrangements affect productivity").
16. See, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000) (describing the authors' involvement in the failed attempt to rewrite Russian
corporate law along U.S. lines).
17. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
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stockholders.. ."" Despite occasional academic arguments to the contrary, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm expounded by these courts indisputably is
the law in the United States.' 9
Shareholder primacy encompasses the shareholder wealth maximization
norm, but adds to it control claims. Shareholder primacy thus contends not only
that shareholders are the principals on whose behalf corporate governance is
organized, but also that shareholders do (and should) exercise ultimate control of
the corporate enterprise. Hence, for example, shareholder primacy assumes
shareholder voting rights that are both exclusive and strong.' °
In fact, however, shareholder control rights are so weak that they scarcely
qualify as part of corporate governance. Under the Delaware code, for example,
shareholder voting rights are essentially limited to the election of directors and
approval of charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of
the corporation's assets, and voluntary dissolution. 2 As a formal matter, only the
election of directors and amending the bylaws do not require board approval
before shareholder action is possible.2 In practice, of course, even the election of
directors (absent a proxy contest) is predetermined by the existing board
nominating the next year's board. 3
These direct restrictions on shareholder power are supplemented by a host of
other rules that indirectly prevent shareholders from exercising significant influence
over corporate decisionmaking. Three sets of statutes are especially noteworthy: (1)
disclosure requirements pertaining to large holders; 24 (2) shareholder voting and
18. Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1989).
19. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1423, 1423-25 (1993) (stating: "Despite a smattering of evidence
to the contrary, the mainstream of corporate law remains committed to the principles espoused by the Dodge
court.... [T]he shareholder wealth maximization norm thus remains a more accurate description of the state of
the law than any of its competitors"); see also David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique
of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1003 (2000) (noting "the widely held
view that corporate law currently endorses a principal-agent, shareholder primacy understanding of the board's
responsibility").
20. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 449 (making that assumption).
21. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 174-77 (1995) (summarizing
state corporate law on shareholder voting entitlements).
22. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211 (2000).
23. See generally Bayless Manning, The American Stockholder, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485-89 (1958)
(book review) (describing incumbent control of the proxy voting machinery).
24. Securities Exchange Act § 13(d) and the SEC rules thereunder require extensive disclosures from
any person or group acting together which acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of the outstanding
shares of any class of equity stock in a given issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2001). The disclosures required by
§ 13(d) impinge substantially on investor privacy and thus may discourage some investors from holding blocks
greater than 4.9% of a company's stock. U.S. institutional investors frequently cite § 13(d)'s application to
groups and the consequent risk of liability for failing to provide adequate disclosures as an explanation for the
general lack of shareholder activism on their part. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate
Governance in the United States, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 461
(1998).
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communication rules;" and (3) insider trading and short swing profits rules.26 These
laws affect shareholders in two respects. First, they discourage the formation of large
stock blocks.27 Second, they discourage communication and coordination among
shareholders.28
Despite the limitations of shareholder voting rights, some scholars argue the
market for corporate control ensures a residual form of shareholder control,
transforming "the limited de jure shareholder voice into a powerful de facto form
of shareholder control."29 To be sure, the market for corporate control depends on
the existence of shareholder voting rights. Moreover, the market for corporate
control doubtless is an important accountability mechanism. 3° Market-based
accountability and control-by which I mean the right to exercise decisionmaking
fiat-are distinct concepts, however. Directors are held accountable to shareholders
through a variety of market forces, such as the capital and reputational markets,
but one cannot fairly say that those markets confer control fights on the
shareholders. How then can one say that the market for corporate control does
so? The fight to fire is not the right to exercise fiat-it is only the right to
discipline. In any event, takeover defenses-especially the combination of a
poison pill and a classified board-go a long way towards restoring director
primacy vis-A-vis the shareholders.3
25. To the extent shareholders exercise any control over the corporation, they do so only through control
of the board of directors. As such, it is the shareholders' ability to affect the election of directors that determines
the degree of influence they will hold over the corporation. The proxy regulatory regime discourages large
shareholders from seeking to replace incumbent directors with their own nominees. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1075-84 (describing incentives
against proxy contests). It also discourages shareholders from communicating with one another. See Stephen
Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233 (2000)
(explaining that liberalization of the proxy rules has not significantly affected shareholder communication
practices).
26. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
671, 712-13 (1995) (noting insider trading concerns raised by shareholder activism).
27. Large block formation may also be discouraged by state corporate law rules governing minority
shareholder protections. Under Delaware law, a controlling shareholder has fiduciary obligations to the
minority. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). A controlling shareholder who uses
its power to force the corporation to enter into contracts with the shareholder or its affiliates on unfair terms can
be held liable for the resulting injury to the minority. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del.
1971). A controlling shareholder who uses its influence to effect a freeze-out merger in which the minority
shareholders are bought out at an unfairly low price likewise faces liability. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
28. For a more detailed treatment of the effects of these statutes on shareholder control, see Bainbridge,
supra note 11.
29. John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S.
Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 850-51 (1999).
30. See generally Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965), which is the seminal work on the market for corporate control as a means of corporate accountability.
See William J. Carney, The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the
Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999); Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 50 CASEW, RES. L. REV. 245 (1999).
31. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory
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Other scholars have argued that institutional investor activism can give real teeth
to shareholder control.3" Acknowledging that the rational apathy phenomenon
precludes small individual shareholders from playing an active role in corporate
governance, even if the various legal impediments to shareholder activism were
removed, these scholars focused their attention on institutional investors, such as
pension and mutual funds. Institutional investors, at least potentially, may behave
quite differently than dispersed individual investors. Because they own large
blocks and have an incentive to develop specialized expertise in making and
monitoring investments, they could play a far more active role in corporate
governance than dispersed shareholders. Institutional investors holding large
blocks thus have more power to hold management accountable for actions that do
not promote shareholder welfare. Their greater access to firm information,
coupled with their concentrated voting power, might enable them to more
actively monitor the firm's performance and make changes in the board's
composition when performance lagged.
There is relatively little evidence that institutional investor activism has
mattered, however. Due to a resurgence of direct individual investment in the
stock market, motivated at least in part by the day trading phenomenon and the
technology stock bubble, the trend towards institutional domination has
stagnated. Although about fifty percent of equity securities are owned by
institutions, large blocks held by a single investor are rare, and few U.S.
corporations have any institutional shareholders who own more than five-to-ten
percent of their stock.33 Even the most active institutional investors spend only
trifling amounts on corporate governance activism. Institutions devote little effort
to monitoring management; to the contrary, they typically disclaim the ability or
desire to decide company-specific policy questions. 34 They rarely conduct proxy
solicitations or put forward shareholder proposals.35 Not surprisingly, empirical
studies of U.S. institutional investor activism have found "no strong evidence of
a correlation between firm performance and percentage of shares owned by
institutions.
'36
Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 125-26 (2001) (discussing effectiveness of pill-classified board combination
as a means of ensuring continued board control); see also Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups:
Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's Power to "Just Say No," 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 999, 1017-18 (1999)
(using legal treatment of poison pill and classified board provisions as a measure of jurisdictional commitment
to shareholder primacy).
32. See, e.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 520 (1990). For more skeptical analyses, see Edward Rock, The Logic and Uncertain Significance of
Institutional Investor Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of
Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163 (1991).
33. See Black, supra note 32, at 567-68 (summarizing data).
34. See Black, supra note 24, at 460 (noting that even "activist institutions spend less than half a basis
point of assets ... on their governance efforts").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 462.
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In sum, shareholders are almost wholly lacking in either direct or indirect
mechanisms of control. Likewise, there is little evidence of effective shareholder
demand for such control. Instead, control is vested in the board of directors. To
be sure, former Delaware Chancellor William Allen once opined that "our
corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it
does not create Platonic masters., 37 In fact, however, under U.S. corporate law
the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a sui
38
generis body-indeed, a sort of Platonic guardian -serving as the nexus for the
various contracts making up the corporation.
Under all state corporation codes, the key players in the statutory decision
making structure are the corporation's directors.39 As the Delaware code puts it,
the corporation's business and affairs "shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors."''4 The vast majority of corporate decisions accordingly
are made by the board of directors alone (or by managers acting under delegated
authority). 4' The statutory decision making model thus is one in which the board
acts and shareholders, at most, react. Put simply, control is vested in the board-
not the shareholders.42
To be sure, it is often said that, in the real world, boards are captured by
senior management. According to this view, senior "managers dominate their
boards by using their de facto power to select and compensate directors and by
exploiting personal ties with them. 43 The board capture phenomenon seems less
valid today, however, than it once was. During the 1980s and 1990s, several
37. Blasius Indust. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
38. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 289-90 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1991). In which Socrates describes the
education of philosopher-kings who rule "for the public good, not as though they were performing some heroic
action, but simply as a matter of duty." Id.
39. All state corporate codes provide for a system of nearly absolute delegation of power to the board of
directors, which in turn is authorized to further delegate power to subordinate firm agents. See MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT ANN. § 8.01 at 8-10 to 8-11 (1995) (reviewing statutes).
40. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). Of course, operational decisions normally are delegated by
the board to subordinate employees. The board, however, retains the power to hire and fire firm employees and
to define the limits of their authority. Moreover, certain extraordinary acts may not be delegated, but are instead
reserved for the board's exclusive determination. See, e.g., Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1959);
Lucy v. Hero Int'l Corp., 281 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. 1972).
41. The word "decision" is used herein for semantic convenience to describe a process that often is
much less discrete in practice. Most board of director activity "does not consist of taking affirmative action on
individual matters; it is instead a continuing flow of supervisory process, punctuated only occasionally by a
discrete transactional decision." Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1494 (1984).
42. The board of directors as an institution of corporate governance, of course, does not follow
inexorably from the necessity for fiat. After all, an individual chief executive could serve as the hypothesized
central coordinator. Yet, corporate law vests ultimate control in the board. Why? I have elsewhere suggested
two answers to that question: (1) under certain conditions, groups make better decisions than individuals and (2)
group decisionmaking is an important constraint on agency costs. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. I (2002).
43. Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic
Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 72-73 (1990).
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trends coalesced to encourage more active and effective board oversight. Much
director compensation is now paid in stock, for example, which helps align
director and shareholder interests.44 Courts have made clear that effective board
processes and oversight are essential if board decisions are to receive the
deference traditionally accorded to them under the business judgment rule,
especially insofar as structural decisions are concerned (such as those relating to
management buy-outs).45 Director conduct is constrained by an active market for
corporate control, ever-rising rates of shareholder litigation, and some say-
albeit erroneously, activist shareholders. 46 As a result, modem boards of directors
typically are smaller than their antecedents, meet more often, are more independent
from management, own more stock, and have better access to information. These
developments culminated in a series of high-profile board revolts against incumbent
managers at such iconic American corporations as General Motors, Westinghouse,
and American Express. 47 More recently, the firing of "Chainsaw Al" Dunlap by
Sunbeam's board provides yet more anecdotal evidence of board activism.48
In any event, the institutional structure created by corporate law allows, but
does not contemplate, a one-man rule. If it comes to overt conflict between the
board and top management, the board's authority prevails as a matter of law, if
not always in practice. Indeed, it is the necessity for retaining dismissal of senior
management as a potential sanction that explains why the board is at the apex of
the corporate hierarchy rather than functioning as an advisory committee off to
the side of the corporate organizational chart. One can imagine a structure of
corporate authority identical to current norms except that the board acts as a mere
advisory body to a single autocratic CEO. On the face of it, such a structure
seemingly would preserve most advantages of the current structure. Consequently, it
44. Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board: The History of a
Symptom anda Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996).
45. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1068-81 (1993) (describing how judicial review of management buyouts and other
conflict of interest transactions focuses on the role of independent directors).
46. Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding
Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489 (1999). For skepticism
as to the latter claim, see supra notes 33-36 and related discussion (positing minimal corporate governance
influence by activist institutional investors).
47. See Ira M. Milstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485, 1489-90 (1993)
(discussing such cases). As boards become stronger and more independent of top management, moreover, the
process builds momentum. For example, James Westphal and Edward Zajac have demonstrated that as board
power increases relative to the CEO, newly appointed directors become more demographically similar to the
board. James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity,
and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60 (1995) (measuring power by such factors as the percentage
of insiders and whether the CEO also served as chairman; cautioning that CEO control over director selection
remains the general rule).
48. See Dana Canedy, Sunbeam's Board, in Revolt, Ousts Job-Cutting Chairman, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
1998, at Al. In most cases, of course, board oversight tends to be both less dramatic and more informal.
Individual directors pass concerns onto the CEO, who in turn bounces ideas off board members. Rather than
struggling to overcome the collective action problems that impede firing a CEO, an individual director tries to
obtain better performance through a private reprimand.
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is the board's power to hire and fire senior management that explains their position at
the apex of the corporate hierarchy. In turn, that position is why U.S. corporate law is
better described as a system of director primacy than one of either shareholder or
managerial primacy.
II. THE POTENTIAL FOR SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN SLOVENIA
Shortly after achieving independence from the former Yugoslav federation,
Slovenia adopted a new corporation law-the Law on Commercial Companies-
to replace the former Enterprise Law.49 The new law was modeled mainly on the
German Aktiengesetz statute, along with various other German and Austrian
precedents, rather than on Anglo-American corporation law. ° Unlike U.S.
corporate law, Slovenian corporate law thus includes many features of German or
Austrian corporations, especially a codetermination-based system of corporate
governance including a two-tier governance system with employee participation
on both the supervisory board and the management board.5'
As a matter of formal statutory law, Slovenian corporation law thus vests
substantial power in labor representatives. At the plant level, work councils elect
labor representatives to the corporation's supervisory and management boards, as
well as have a voice in local plant issues." In companies with fewer than one
thousand employees, at least one-third of the supervisory board's members must
be employee representatives." In companies with more than one thousand
employees, at least half of the members must be employee representatives 4 The
statute also mandates a labor representative on the management board of all
corporations with more than five hundred employees, who is charged with
representing workers' interests with respect to personnel and social matters. 55 As
49. Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 49. The Enterprise law had been enacted during the last
years of former Yugoslavia to reintroduce-after five decades of state and social ownership--a capitalist, free
market, property rights-based corporate law. Id. Corporation-like firms under the former system were labor-
managed or self-managed and, as such, were not comparable with U.S.-style capital-owned firms. Id. at 49 n.2.
50. Id. at 49. It is conventional to bifurcate corporate governance systems between the U.S.-style
market-oriented model with an active capital market and diffuse ownership and the German-style bank-oriented
model with a less active capital market and highly concentrated ownership. Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility
and Competition Between European and American Corporate Governance: Which Model of Capitalism?, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833 (1998). Due to the high degree of institutional ownership, Slovenia's current system is
closer to the bank-centered model. A principal difference between the Slovene and German models, however, is
that in the former banks are only one category of important institutions. Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 13, at
57 n.31.
51. On the distinction between management and supervisory boards, and employee entitlement to
representation thereon, see Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 58-60.
52. See id. at 59 (noting role of works council in nominating board members).
53. Id. at 58-59.
54. Id. at 59.
55. Id.
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a formal matter, Slovenian corporate law thus stands as a counterfactual to the
pro-convergence position."
As a practical matter, however, the potential for shareholder primacy-or, more
precisely, ultimate shareholder control-lurks within the structure of Slovenian
corporate governance. Although precise data on the degree of institutional ownership
apparently is not available, there seems no doubt that privatization resulted in
substantial institutional ownership of Slovene corporations. 57 All of the methods by
which Slovenian firms were privatized required that forty percent of the newly
formed corporation's shares be issued to three state-controlled investment funds. 8
One of those funds, the state development fund, subsequently exchanged a
substantial amount of ownership certificates to investment companies that had been
expressly formed to trade in privatized corporation shares.59 Finally, institutional
investors have been actively acquiring those shares originally issued to the public and
employees. An empirical survey by the Research Center for Legal Comparative and
Development Studies at the University of Ljubljana found a substantial decrease of
the number of shareholders in each corporation, probably resulting from the selling
of shares by small holdersi' According to one estimate, about eighty percent of
Slovenian equities are now controlled by a relatively small number of institutions-
pension funds, banks, insurance and investment companies, and state-controlled
funds.6
In addition to the sheer size of their holdings, at least three other factors
further enhance the power of Slovene institutional investors. First, it has become
commonplace for large holders to enter into informal shareholder agreements
pursuant to which they act in concert.6' This effectively further concentrates
ownership by linking large block holders. Second, small holders have no
experience, knowledge, or tradition of ownership. They do not participate at
63shareholder meetings, even by proxy, and thus lack any meaningful voice.
Finally, despite the formal statutory mandates, few corporations have appointed
labor representatives to the management board.
Unlike the U.S. model in which ownership and control are separated, Slovenian
corporate governance thus potentially resembles what Berle and Means called
minority control. Such control exists where "a small group hold[s] a sufficient stock
interest to be in a position to dominate a corporation through their stock interest.'
6
Consistent with this hypothesis, Slovene institutional investors increasingly
56. See Branson, supra note 4, at 328 (pointing to the "conscious choice in post-privatized Slovenia for
extensive labor involvement" as evidence demonstrating "a decided lack of convergence").
57. For a description of the privatization process, see Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 53-56.
58. Id. at 56.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 56-57 n.30.
61. Bainbridge, supra note 1I.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. BERLE& MEANS, supra note 6, at 75.
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pursue an active role in corporate governance and decisionmaking . Indeed,
these institutions are becoming quite aggressive, in the sense of intervening even
in how management boards make day-to-day business decisions. They control
the composition of the supervisory board and exercise de facto control over the
selection of management board members, as well as bringing informal pressure
to bear on the management board's conduct of the business.6
III. DOES IT MATTER? THE NORMATIVE APPEAL
OF DIRECTOR PRIMACY
The separation of ownership and control characteristics of U.S. corporations
has costs, as Berle and Means recognized more than six decades ago: "The
separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of
owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge....",67 Modern
scholars refer to the consequences of these divergences as agency costs, which
are conventionally defined as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus
any residual loss, incurred to prevent shirking by agents. 8 In turn, shirking is
conventionally defined to include any action by a member of a production team that
diverges from the interests of the team as a whole. As such, shirking includes not
only culpable cheating, but also negligence, oversight, incapacity, and even honest
mistakes. 69
A sole proprietorship with no agents will internalize all costs of shirking
because the proprietor's optimal tradeoff between labor and leisure is, by
definition, the same as the firm's optimal tradeoff. ° Agents of a firm will not
internalize all of the costs of shirking, however, because the principal reaps part
of the value of hard work by the agent, but the agent receives all of the value of
shirking.] Alchian and Demsetz offered the useful example of two workers who
jointly lift heavy boxes into a truck. The marginal productivity of each worker is
very difficult to measure and their joint output cannot be easily separated into
individual components.73 In such situations, obtaining information about a team
65. Bainbridge, supra note II.
66. Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 57.
67. BERLE& MEANS, supra note 6, at 7.
68. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.
301, 304 (1983) (defining agency costs). See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (setting out
agency cost economics).
69. Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 465 (1992).
70. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 68, at 312-13 (explaining incentives of owner-manager of a
wholly owned firm).
71. See id. at 313 (noting that the incentive to appropriate perquisites rises as the manager's fractional
ownership share falls).
72. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972).
73. Id. at 780.
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member's productivity and appropriately rewarding each team member therefore
are very difficult and costly. In the absence of such information, however, the
disutility of labor gives each team member an incentive to shirk because the
individual's reward is unlikely to be closely related to conscientiousness.74
Although agents ex post have strong incentives to shirk, ex ante they have
equally strong incentives to agree to a corporate contract containing terms
designed to prevent shirking.75 Bounded rationality, however, precludes firms and
agents from entering into the complete contract necessary to prevent shirking by
the latter." Instead, there must be some system of ex post governance: some
mechanism for detecting and punishing shirking. Accordingly, an essential
economic function of management is monitoring the various inputs into the team
effort. Specifically, management meters the marginal productivity of each team
member and then takes steps to reduce shirking.77
The Alchian and Demsetz model, as they recognized, forces one to examine
the question: who will monitor the monitors?" In any team organization, one
must have some ultimate monitor who has sufficient incentives to ensure firm
productivity without himself having to be monitored. Otherwise, one ends up
with a never-ending series of monitors monitoring lower level monitors.79
Alchian and Demsetz solved this dilemma by consolidating the roles of ultimate
monitor and residual claimant.8° If the constituent entitled to the firm's residual
income is given final monitoring authority, he is encouraged to detect and punish
shirking by the firm's other inputs because his reward will vary exactly with his
success as a monitor.
Unfortunately, this elegant theory breaks down precisely where it would be
most useful. Because of the separation of ownership and control, it simply does
not describe the modem publicly-held U.S. corporation. As the corporation's
residual claimants, the shareholders should act as the firm's ultimate monitors."
But while U.S. law provides shareholders with some enforcement and electoral
82rights, these are quite limited. In general, as we have seen, shareholders of
public U.S. corporations have neither the legal right, the practical ability, nor the
74. See id. (explaining how monitoring and related costs give "each person [an incentive] to take more
leisure").
75. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 68, at 325-26 (discussing incentives for agents to incur bonding
costs).
76. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 30-32, 45-46
(1985) (defining bounded rationality and describing its effects on the contracting process).
77. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 72, at 794.
78. Id. at 782.
79. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 874 n.38 (1991) (quoting a story by Dr. Suess illustrating the
problem).
80. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 72, at 782.
81. See id. at 787-89 (discussing corporate form).
82. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing shareholder electoral rights).
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desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of the
corporation's agents.83
As noted above, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, some scholars argued
that the rising importance of institutional investors would change the analysis.8
Corporations with large blocks of stock held by institutional investors thus would
come to resemble Alchian and Demsetz's firm, in which the residual claimants
act as the ultimate monitor of the firm's agents. As a result, concentrated
ownership in the hands of institutional investors would lead to a reduction in
shirking and, hence, a reduction in agency costs. In turn, that should lead to a
more efficient economy. Or so the story went. As we have seen, however, there is
relatively little evidence that institutional activism has mattered other than at the
margins."
Some former advocates of institutional investor activism have therefore
retreated to the more modest claim that "it's hard to be against institutional
investor activism." 6 Yet, even this last revisionist redoubt fails to adequately
acknowledge that the purported benefits of institutional control, if any, may come
at too high a cost. As even one of the most prominent proponents of institutional
investor activism conceded, for example, there is good evidence that bank control
of the securities markets has harmed the Japanese and German economies by
impeding the development of new businesses.87 Unfortunately, the same may
prove true in our case study-i.e., Slovenia. Although a large number of new
corporations have been formed in Slovenia post-privatization, they are
economically insignificant both individually and collectively."8 The substantial
institutionalization of the Slovene markets thus may impede development of the
sort of active venture capital market that drives the U.S. economy.
Because we are concerned with the governance of large publicly held corporations,
however, this essay focuses on a different concem-namely, the risk that institutional
investors may abuse their control by self-dealing and other forms of over-reaching. In
his important study of institutional ownership, Mark Roe contended that large block
holders can improve firm performance by personifying the shareholder community. s9
He argued that loyalty to real people may be a better motivator than loyalty to an
abstract collection of small shareholders. 9° The trouble, of course, is that the
interests of large and small investors often differ.9' If the board becomes more
83. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text (identifying the legal limits on shareholder power).
84. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also Branson, supra note 4, at 322 (arguing that elite
corporate law scholarship tends to be faddish and specifically criticizing those "scholars [who] wrote about, and
subsequently oversold, institutional investor activism").
85. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
86. Black, supra note 24, at 462.
87. ROE, supra note 32, at 256.
88. Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 56 n.29.
89. ROE, supra note 32, at 237-38.
90. Id.
91. Rock, supra note 32, at 466-68; Rosenbaum, supra note 32, at 176-79.
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beholden to the interests of large shareholders, it may become less concerned
with the welfare of smaller investors.
Again, the Slovenian example is instructive. An initial source of concern is
the continuing presence of state-controlled funds as very large shareholders in
nominally privatized Slovene corporations.92 As an owner, the state acts in much
the same way as other institutional owners; i.e., it is an active participant, especially
in industrial sectors having a public interest. In such firms, the state combines its
function as a stockholder with its role as a regulator. This combination threatens to
subordinate corporate decisions to political goals. There is great danger of
political interference not only in large corporate policy, but even in day-to-day
business and personnel questions. The adverse economic impact of continuing
state ownership is evidenced in a recent empirical study of several Central and
Eastern European nations, including Slovenia, finding that enterprises that had
been fully privatized for at least four years increased their productivity three-to-
five times faster than enterprises that are still state-owned.93
A second (and more general) concern is that institutional investors will be
tempted to use their position to self-deal, i.e., to take a non-pro rata share of the
firms assets and earnings. There is substantial evidence that the risk of self-
dealing by large institutional investors is a very serious one. In the United States,
for example, there was considerable looting in the turn of the century insurance
industry, as insurance company managers obtained low-interest loans and jobs
from portfolio firms. 4 In Russia, privatization during the 1990s resulted in a
"kleptocracy" of controlling investors who have engaged in rampant self-
dealing.95 In the Czech Republic, post-privatization consolidation of stock
ownership likewise led to widespread looting of privatized enterprises by their
controlling shareholders. 96
Let us make the heroic assumption, however, that institutional investors are
entirely selfless. Institutional investor activism would still be undesirable if the
separation of ownership and control mandated by U.S. law has substantial
efficiency benefits. Questions of whether differing corporate law regimes confer
comparative advantages on national economies are sharply debated, and the relative
merits of the various national models are vigorously disputed even among those who
92. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
93. Gerhard Pohl et al., Privatization and Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence and
Policy Options, World Bank Technical Paper No. 368 (1997), available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/
notes/123/123pohl.pdf (copy on file with The Transnational Lawyer).
94. ROE, supra note 32, at 67.
95. Black et al., supra note 16, at 1746.
96. John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 10 (1999). On the other hand, Edwards and Weichenrieder argue that the economic
benefits of concentrated ownership in the German economy have outweighed its costs. See Jeremy Edwards &
Alfons Weichenrieder, Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence From Germany (1999),
available at http://www.papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstract_id=.175333 (copy of file with The Transnational
Lawyer).
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think that corporate law matters insofar as national productivity and competitiveness
are concerned. Yet, while the matter undoubtedly remains unproven, there are
sound reasons to suspect that the U.S. model has significant advantages.
Berle and Means, of course, believed that the separation of ownership and
control was both a departure from historical norms and a serious economic
problem.97 They likely were wrong on the former score, although that is a question
beyond the scope of this essay.98 As to the latter, the separation of ownership and
control is a highly efficient solution to the decisionmaking problems faced by large
corporations.
This essay's normative justification of director primacy is grounded in
Kenneth Arrow's work on organizational decisionmaking, which identified two
basic decisionmaking mechanisms: "consensus" and "authority."' 9 Consensus is
utilized where each member of the organization has identical information and
interests, which facilitates collective decisionmaking. In contrast, authority-based
decisionmaking structures arise where team members have different interests and
amounts of information. Because collective decisionmaking is impracticable in
such settings, authority-based structures are characterized by the existence of a
central agency to which all relevant information is transmitted and which is
empowered to make decisions binding on the whole. "°
Decisionmaking systems in small business firms typically resemble Arrow's
consensus model.' °' As firms grow in size, however, consensus-based decisionmaking
systems become less practical. By the time we reach the publicly held corporation,
their use becomes essentially impractical.' °2 Indeed, the modem public corporation
precisely fits Arrow's model of an authority-based decisionmaking structure.
10 3
Shareholders have neither the information nor the incentives necessary to make
sound decisions on either operational or policy questions." Overcoming the
collective action problems that prevent meaningful shareholder involvement
would be difficult and costly. '°5 Rather, shareholders will prefer to irrevocably
delegate decisionmaking authority to some smaller group.'O° Separating ownership
97. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 3-10 (discussing a perceived transition in the nature of the
corporation and describing the purported consequences thereof).
98. The classic debunking of Berle and Means' historical account remains Walter Werner, Corporation
Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611 (1981).
99. KENNETHJ. ARROW, THE LIMrrS OFORGANIZATIoN 68-70 (1974).
100. Id. at 68-69.
101. See Dooley, supra note 69, at 466-67 (applying Arrow's model to partnerships).
102. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An Organizational
Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1055-75 (1998) (explaining the necessity of authority-based governance in
public corporations).
103. Dooley, supra note 69, at 467-68.
104. See Bainbridge, supra note 102, at 1057-60 (identifying the conflicting interests and access to
information of corporate constituents).
105. Id. at 1056.
106. As Arrow explains, under conditions of disparate access to information and conflicting interests, it
is "cheaper and more efficient to transmit all the pieces of information to a central place" and to have the central
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and control by vesting decisionmaking authority in a centralized entity distinct from
the shareholders thus makes the large public corporation feasible.
To be sure, this separation results in the agency cost problem described above.
A narrow focus on agency costs, however, easily can distort one's understanding.
Corporate directors operate within a pervasive web of accountability mechanisms
that substitute for monitoring by residual claimants. Important constraints are
provided by a variety of market forces. The capital and product markets, the
internal and external employment markets, and the market for corporate control all
constrain shirking by firm agents.
An even more important consideration, however, is that agency costs are the
inevitable consequence of vesting discretion in someone other than the residual
claimant. We could substantially reduce, if not eliminate, agency costs by
eliminating discretion; that we do not do so suggests that discretion has
substantial virtues. A complete theory of the firm thus requires one to balance the
virtues of discretion against the need to require that discretion be used
responsibly.' °7 Neither discretion nor accountability can be ignored, because both
promote values essential to the survival of business organizations. Unfortunately,
however, they also are antithetical-at some point, one cannot have more of one
without also having less of the other. This is so because the power to hold to
account is ultimately the power to decide. As Kenneth Arrow explained:
[Accountability mechanisms] must be capable of correcting errors but
should not be such as to destroy the genuine values of authority. Clearly,
a sufficiently strict and continuous organ of [accountability] can easily
amount to a denial of authority. If every decision of A is to be reviewed
by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to
B and hence no solution to the original problem.Iw'
Hence, directors cannot be held accountable without undermining their discretionary
authority. Establishing the proper mix of discretion and accountability thus emerges
as the central corporate governance question.
The root economic argument against shareholder activism thus becomes
apparent. Large-scale investor involvement in corporate decision making seems
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable;
namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable decisionmaking authority in
the board of directors. The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not
office "make the collective choice and transmit it rather than retransmit all the information on which the decision is
based." ARROW, supra note 99, at 68-69. In the dominant M-form corporation, the board of directors and the
senior management team function as that central office. See Bainbridge, supra note 102, at 1009 (discussing M-
form corporation).
107. Cf. Dooley, supra note 69, at 471 (arguing that the business judgment rule reflects a tension
between "conflicting values" he refers to as "authority" and "responsibility").
108. ARROW, supra note 99, at 78.
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that it permits the aggregation of large capital pools, as some have suggested,'O°
but rather that it provides a hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to
the problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees,
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs. In such a firm, someone must
be in charge: "Under conditions of widely dispersed information and the need for
speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for
success."" ° While Roe argues that shareholder activism "differs, at least in form,
from completely shifting authority from managers to" institutions,"' it is in fact a
difference in form only. Shareholder activism necessarily contemplates that
institutions will review management decisions, step in when management
performance falters, and exercise voting control to effect a change in policy or
personnel. For the reasons identified above, giving institutions this power of
review differs little from giving them the power to make management decisions
in the first place."2 Even though institutional investors probably would not
micromanage portfolio corporations, vesting them with the power to review
major decisions inevitably shifts some portion of the board's authority to them.
Given the significant virtues of discretion, one ought not lightly interfere
with management or the board's decisionmaking authority in the name of
accountability. Preservation of managerial discretion should always be the null
hypothesis. The separation of ownership and control mandated by U.S. corporate
law has precisely that effect. If U.S.-style corporate governance is an appropriate
model towards which international systems ought to converge, as many players
in the convergence debate assert," 3 the goal of convergence must be director-
not shareholder-primacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The difference between director and shareholder primacy matters. The
convergence debate is descriptively flawed because it assumes that the U.S.
model towards which global corporate governance systems are (or are not)
converging is one based shareholder primacy. It is not. Insofar as shareholder
primacy contemplates ultimate shareholder control, U.S. corporate law is not
characterized by shareholder primacy. Instead, the U.S. model is one of director
primacy. Directors act and shareholders, at most, react. The convergence debate
is prescriptively flawed insofar as it claims transition economics (or established
bank-centered economies, for that matter) ought to embrace shareholder primacy.
If U.S.-style corporate governance has systemic economic advantages, those
109. See ROE, supra note 32, at 3-4 (summarizing this argument).
110. ARROW, supra note 99, at 69.
111. ROE, supra note 32, at 184 (emphasis in original).
112. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
113. See Branson, supra note 4, at 350-52 (asserting that elite academic proponents of convergence have
failed to adequately anticipate backlash against "American economic imperialism").
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advantages are attributable not to shareholder primacy but to the numerous legal
regimes that enforce director primacy.
